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Anthropocentric Realism about Values
BRYAN W. VAN NORDEN
For if the Good predicated in common is some single thing, or 
something separated, itself in itself, clearly it is not the sort of good 
a human being can pursue in action or possess; but the latter is just 
the sort we are looking for in our present inquiry.
—Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.6 
The rules are the beginning of order, but the gentleman is the 
origin of the rules.
—Xunzi, “The Way of a Ruler”
It is a commonplace to observe that, in contemporary academia, there is 
no connection between being a person who studies ethics and being an 
ethical person. However, my sense is that Joel Kupperman is both. Indeed, 
I think if Kongzi were alive today, he would recognize Kupperman as 
the sort of “gentleman” (junzi) that he hoped to produce via his process 
of ethical cultivation. But a gentleman like Kupperman does not seek 
acclaim, and I will honor his preferences by praising his character no more.
Some Typologies
While I fall far short of Kupperman in the more important level of prac-
tice, I am pleased that I share many of his views at the level of theory: 
65
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66 Bryan W. Van Norden
realism, particularism, pluralism, and fallibilism. (1) Realism: Values are, 
in some sense, objective. This does not entail that they are objective 
in the way that properties like mass or entities like zebras are. However, 
neither are they purely subjective (in the way that my preference for 
chicken over !sh is subjective) or a result of mere intersubjective consen-
sus (in the way that “Three strikes and you’re out” is).1 (2) Particularism 
(or contextualism): Values are highly context-sensitive. If we ask, “Is it 
permissible to lie?” the right response is to ask back, “About what? To 
whom? In what circumstances?” and many other questions. Although 
there is a strong presumption in favor of honesty, it is defeasible in many 
situations, ranging from the trivial example of !bbing to a friend about 
a surprise birthday party to the weighty example of Miep Gies hiding 
Anne Frank and her family from the Nazis.2 (3) Pluralism: There are a 
variety of incommensurable kinds of value. As a result, there are a plural-
ity of worthwhile ways of life. It might be better for Bloggs to become 
an FBI agent and for me to become a college professor (because of our 
respective aptitudes, interests, and traits of character); but my life of 
theoretical inquiry and teaching is not intrinsically better than Bloggs’s 
life of practical action and intervention. The two of us can achieve dif-
ferent but equally valuable varieties of human "ourishing and manifest 
distinct but equally worthwhile forms of virtues such as benevolence and 
integrity.3 (4) Fallibilism: Because there are evaluative facts that we can 
be wrong about, and because value is so context-sensitive, and because 
we cannot fully appreciate values in other ways of life that we have not 
experienced4—for all these reasons, we must be continually mindful of 
the possibility of error in our valuations.5 
In this essay, I am going to focus on the !rst thesis: realism. Realism 
can take different forms.6 (i) The default target of anti-realists often 
seems to be Platonic realism. The Platonist holds that ethical values 
are part of the fabric of the universe, and would be there whether any 
human beings had existed or not. For the Platonist, values are not reduc-
ible to natural or physical properties, but they are similar to them in 
that their existence does not depend upon human cognition or motiva-
tion. (ii) Anthropocentric realism is importantly different. In order to 
understand it, consider the following non-moral concept: “poisonous.” 
“The respiration of pure carbon dioxide is poisonous” is true for all 
humans. But it is not true for plants. Furthermore, the very notion of 
“poison” is meaningful only in the context of living organisms. From 
the perspective of pure physics, nothing is poisonous. Nonetheless, it 
is true or false that something is poisonous (for humans), whether a 
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67Anthropocentric Realism about Values
particular individual or a culture is aware of this fact or not. We might 
say that poisonous-for-humans is an anthropocentric quality. It is useful 
and meaningful only because humans exist, but since humans do exist 
there are objective facts about what is poisonous for them. Similarly, the 
anthropocentric realist about values claims that evaluative properties and 
judgments are meaningful and useful only because humans—with their 
distinctive needs, potentials and limitations—exist. Nonetheless, there 
are facts about values that do not depend upon the beliefs or endorse-
ments of any particular individual or culture. 
Kupperman draws the contrast between Platonic and anthropocen-
tric realism in this way:
In sorting out the issues of value realism, we need to decide 
between two starting points. One is putative value facts. . . . If 
this is our starting point, then we will need to train, as it 
were, our value telescopes to !nd out whether there was 
something we were talking about. The other is our talk and 
thought about values, including the standards of evidence 
and logical relations that are implicit in these practices. If 
this is our starting point, then we will need to inquire into 
justi!cation of judgments of value, and in particular whether 
there is justi!cation for claiming that some judgments are 
authoritative (telling us what really is of value).7
Kupperman recommends that we reject the !rst approach, along with 
its associated “images of [values as] spectral furniture of the universe.”8 
Instead, we should focus on 
. . . the structure of our discourse about values, [which] 
includes standards (for being in a position to be con!dent of 
judgments of value) that sometimes are met. Hence, we are 
in a position to say that it really is the case that some things 
have high value and that others have low or negative value.9
Kupperman is one of several Western philosophers to offer versions 
of anthropocentric realism.10 However, given Kupperman’s interest in 
Chinese thought, I am particularly intrigued by the possibility that the 
Confucian Xunzi may also be seen as an anthropocentric realist.11 
In contrast with most earlier Chinese philosophers, Xunzi is at 
pains to insist that Heaven is morally indifferent. Heaven does not 
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68 Bryan W. Van Norden
reward the virtuous (with long lives or good harvests) or punish the 
vicious (with illness or natural disasters): “The activities of Heaven are 
constant. They do not persist because of sage-king Yao. They do not 
perish because of tyrant Jie.”12 In fact, Heaven endows humans with a 
nature that is largely self-centered and will lead us into con"ict with 
one another if unchecked:
Humans are born having desires. When they have desires but 
do not get the objects of their desires, then they cannot but 
seek some means of satisfaction. If there is no measure or 
limit to their seeking, then they cannot help but struggle with 
each other. If they struggle with each other then there will be 
chaos, and if there is chaos then they will be impoverished.13
Furthermore, ritual activities such as funerals do not, Xunzi insists, in"u-
ence Heaven or any spiritual entities. “One performs the rain sacri!ce 
and it rains. Why? I say: There is no special reason why. It is the same 
as when one does not perform the rain sacri!ce and it rains anyway.”14 
But if Heaven is morally passive, where do human values and ethical 
practices come from? Xunzi explains that they are arti!cial constructs 
invented to meet human needs: 
In ancient times, the sage-kings saw that because people’s 
nature is bad, they were deviant, dangerous, and not correct 
in their behavior, and they were unruly, chaotic, and not 
well-ordered. Therefore, for their sake they set up ritual and 
standards of righteousness, and established proper models and 
measures.15
For example, mourning rituals express and shape the feelings of loss that 
accompany the death of a loved one, and standards of righteousness pro-
vide guidelines for how to distribute goods so that everyone has enough. 
Despite the fact that ethics is arti!cial, it is objectively justi!ed because 
it achieves the goal of bringing humans into a harmonious relationship 
with each other and with their environment:
For Heaven can give birth to creatures, but it cannot enforce 
distinctions among creatures. Earth can support people, but it 
cannot order people. In the world, the ten thousand things 
and human beings all must await sages, and only then will 
they be appropriately divided up.16 
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Although Xunzi regarded the rituals as arti!cial, he seems to have 
thought that the particular formulation of them by the former sage kings 
was the one best version. For example, Xunzi states that,
[f]or the ritual sacri!ces, one engages in divination and deter-
mines the appropriate day. One fasts and sweeps out the site, 
sets out tables and food offerings, and has the “announcement 
of the assistant,” as if the deceased were attending a banquet. 
The impersonator of the dead takes the goods and from each of 
them makes a sacri!ce, as if the deceased were tasting them.17
Xunzi says of speci!c practices such as these: “Is not ritual perfect indeed! 
It establishes a lofty standard that is the ultimate of its kind, and none 
under Heaven can add to or subtract from it.”18 Consequently, someone 
like me, who does not honor his ancestors in the particular way described 
above, would be dismissed by Xunzi as one of those “foolish, ignorant, 
perverse men” who has not learned the proper way to express suf!cient 
love and respect for his predecessors.19 From a contemporary perspective, 
this seems like a signi!cant limitation of Xunzi’s thought. Surely my own 
“rituals” for honoring my deceased parents (visiting their grave, putting 
"owers on it, pretending to tell them what has happened in our family 
since my last visit, etc.) are just as good. As a pluralist, Kupperman will 
certainly agree that (contrary to Xunzi) there are multiple sets of ritu-
als that can serve the same functions of shaping and expressing human 
emotions. Nonetheless, it seems to me that Kupperman and Xunzi share 
the general view that values depend for their existence on human needs, 
capabilities and practices, but are nonetheless “real” (not simply a mat-
ter of individual or cultural opinion). Now, Kupperman has written a 
very !ne article on Xunzi’s conception of human ethical cultivation, 
in which he notes that Xunzi is similar to Jean Piaget in holding that 
humans must go through distinct levels of development in order to 
become mature ethical agents.20 However, to the best of my knowledge, 
Kupperman has not commented on Xunzi’s meta-ethics. Consequently, 
I will be interested to see whether he !nds my interpretation of Xunzi 
as an anthropocentric realist about values plausible.
Just as moral realism comes in more than one form, so does anti-
realism. (a) Moral relativism is the view that the truth of moral claims 
depends upon the perspective from which they are evaluated. This per-
spective can be either that of an individual (subjectivism) or that of a 
group (cultural relativism). (b) Non-cognitivists typically regard moral 
claims as expressing and encouraging attitudes of some kind. Since they 
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70 Bryan W. Van Norden
are expressions rather than descriptions, moral claims are neither true 
nor false. (c) Error theorists agree with realists that moral language is 
intended to be descriptive, but they argue that there are no objective 
values for our moral terms to refer to.
Theory Moral Statements Are . . . Level of Objectivity
  Platonic
Realism descriptive and can be true or false. Anthropocentric
Relativism descriptive and can be true or false. Intersubjective (cultural
  relativism)
  Subjective
Non-cognitivism expressive rather than descriptive, 
 so neither true nor false.  
Error Theories descriptive but none are true. 
Moral anti-realism (particularly in its relativist form) seems to have 
become the dogma among many college students and their professors. 
Consequently, my two-part project in this paper is to challenge one of 
the standard arguments for anti-realism and to sketch an argument for 
a particular form of anthropocentric realism.
The Argument from Disagreement
The argument from cross-cultural disagreement is the anti-realist argu-
ment most likely to captivate students taking their !rst philosophy 
course. However, it is an argument that is both easy to misunderstand 
and dif!cult to establish. Indeed, I have sometimes been surprised to 
discover that even some philosophers are persuaded by what are demon-
strably inadequate formulations of this argument. Consequently, it is 
best to begin by reviewing why it is fallacious to go directly from the 
premise that there is ethical disagreement to the conclusion that there 
are no objective ethical facts. Pick any topic (T) about which there is 
disagreement. Indeed, let there be sustained and seemingly intractable 
disagreement over T: each party to the disagreement is !rmly convinced 
of his own views, and his efforts to convince the other parties seem to 
fail repeatedly. Can we infer directly from this sort of disagreement to 
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71Anthropocentric Realism about Values
the conclusion that there are no facts about T? We cannot. At least, 
we cannot make this inference without succumbing to an extreme and 
ultimately self-undermining ant-realism about all facts. Consider evolu-
tionary theory. I assume that most of my readers believe that it is true and 
applies to humans. However, 40 percent of the current U.S. population 
believes that “God created human beings pretty much in their present 
form at one time within the last 10,000 years or so.”21 This percentage 
has varied since Gallup started asking the question in 1982, but it has 
always been at least 40 percent. Consequently, if persistent disagree-
ment over T shows there is no fact about T, we must conclude that 
there is no fact about whether evolutionary theory is true. I anticipate 
at least three rebuttals to this argument. (1) “Whether people believe 
it or not, evolutionary theory has been proven to be true.” However, 
“prove” is a weasel word, whose ambiguity allows it to suggest more 
content than it actually has. If we take “proof” to be synonymous with 
strict logical deduction, then no scienti!c theory is ever proven. (This 
is a commonplace of the philosophy of science, in which it is recognized 
that scienti!c theories are interesting and informative precisely because 
they go beyond the evidence that supports them, and hence cannot be 
deduced from that evidence.) In contrast, if “prove” means something 
weaker, such as convincing everyone of a conclusion, then the Gallup 
poll shows that evolution has not been proven in this sense. 
This leads to a second potential rebuttal. (2) “Although not every-
one accepts evolutionary theory, the only reason that people reject it 
is ignorance of the evidence.” This reply does not hold water, because 
a number of people who have been exposed to the evidence, including 
some with legitimate scienti!c credentials, reject evolutionary theory.22 
I assume this will induce the following counterargument: (3) “Only a 
dogmatic bias prevents those who have been exposed to the evidence 
from accepting evolutionary theory.” But we could say the same thing to 
explain why a man as obviously intelligent as John C. Calhoun defended 
slavery, or why well-educated and seemingly informed attorneys in the 
Justice Department of the Bush administration endorsed torture. The 
anti-realist will insist that there is still some difference between the case 
of the informed Creationist and Calhoun, but we see now that disagree-
ment (even seemingly intractable disagreement) is insuf!cient by itself 
to establish that there is no fact about a topic. It is the precise nature 
of the disagreement that establishes this (if anything does).23 
While we cannot logically deduce anti-realism about values from 
simple disagreement about them, some have argued that the best explana-
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tion for the nature and extent of ethical disagreement is that there are 
no objective facts that we are disagreeing about.24 However, no one has 
ever developed this argument in anywhere near enough detail for it to 
be compelling. In order to establish that the ethical disagreement we 
!nd is best explained by there not being ethical facts, it is inadequate 
to trot out vague anecdotes about how “some people think infanticide 
is perfectly !ne.” One must look in detail at what people believe, giving 
thick descriptions of their practices, their own accounts of those prac-
tices, and their sociohistorical contexts. Only then can one even begin 
the process of arguing for an explanation for their beliefs.25
I cannot prove that it is impossible to construct an inference to 
the best explanation argument for anti-realism. However, I would like 
to identify a few hurdles that any such argument must overcome. First, 
as Hume noted long ago, super!cial disagreement over ethical matters 
may mask a fundamental agreement. “The Rhine "ows north, the Rhone 
south; yet both spring from the same mountain, and are also actuated, 
in their opposite directions, by the same principle of gravity.”26 Similarly, 
a positive evaluation of perseverance in the face of danger (courage) 
may manifest itself very differently in a culture at war as opposed to 
a culture at peace. Second, there may be a variety of legitimate ways 
to express the same underlying human value. Herodotus was impressed 
with the starkly different attitudes of the Greeks (who cremated the 
remains of their parents) and of the Callatians (who supposedly ate the 
bodies of their deceased parents). Each was horri!ed at the practices 
of the other.27 However, both rituals express the human sense that we 
must honor the memory of our parents by disposing of their remains in 
a respectful way. Third, the variety we !nd in ethical views may be best 
explained by pluralism about values. Not all values can be instantiated 
in any one form of life, so individuals and cultures must choose which 
values to promote. There is much to commend in the sort of intimate 
community life portrayed in Thornton Wilder’s Our Town. Everyone 
knows everyone else, everyone trusts everyone else, everyone cares for 
everyone else. However, a community like this requires a great deal of 
homogeneity. As Wilder suggests with the suicide of “Simon Stimson,” 
many would !nd this life claustrophobic. Conversely, the fragmented life 
of our modern cities provides much more room for individuality, but also 
a much greater danger of alienation.28 
Fourth, let us not forget that a thoughtful examination of cultural 
disagreement may lead to what seems like deeper (and nonrelative) ethi-
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cal insight. Although I cannot vouch for its accuracy as anthropology, 
Montaigne’s essay “Of Cannibals” is useful as a model of what it would 
look like to use thick description of another culture as the basis for a cri-
tique of one’s own. Many of Montaigne’s contemporaries had concluded 
that the natives of “Antarctic France” (what is now Brazil) were “sav-
ages,” because they practiced cannibalism. However, Montaigne arrives 
at a more nuanced view through a discussion of the role of cannibalism 
in the native culture as a whole. He notes that “Their warfare is wholly 
noble and generous, and as excusable and beautiful as this human disease 
can be,” because (unlike European warfare) it is not motivated by greed, 
the desire for conquest, or religious intolerance. Rather, participation in 
warfare seems to be voluntary, and “its only basis among them is their 
rivalry in valor.” Prisoners of war are treated generously, “so that life 
may be all the dearer to them,” but are also warned of the fate that 
awaits them. “All this is done for the sole purpose of extorting from 
their lips some weak or base word. . . .” However, the natives display 
“the grandeur of an invincible courage,” because there is “not one who 
would not rather be killed and eaten than so much as ask not to be.”29 
When the time comes, prisoners are quickly executed, and their bodies 
eaten as a symbolic indication of conquest. Montaigne concludes with 
a nuanced evaluation of his own culture in comparison with that of the 
cannibals: “I am not sorry that we notice the barbarous horror of such 
acts, but I am heartily sorry that, judging their faults rightly, we should 
be so blind to our own.” Mentioning such cruel tortures as racking 
and live dismemberment, which Europeans of his era had subjected one 
another to “on the pretext of piety and religion,” Montaigne opines, “I 
think there is more barbarity in eating a man alive than in eating him 
dead.”30 Montaigne’s exploration is intriguing precisely because he does 
not throw up his arms and announce, “Who’s to say?” but instead looks 
for a deeper insight.31
Finally, it is worth noting that cultures are not as dissimilar as 
some would have us believe. Much of twentieth-century anthropology 
has stressed cross-cultural variety, to the point of sometimes suggesting 
that there is no such thing as human nature. This has been valuable as 
a corrective to the ethnocentrism that civilizations sometimes succumb 
to.32 However, many of the paradigmatic studies that claimed to show 
practices and beliefs radically different from those in the West have 
been discredited. Margaret Mead’s account of how adolescent sexuality 
in Samoa is unfettered, relaxed, and happy has been shown to be, at 
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best, dubious. Benjamin Whorf’s claim that the Hopi language lacks 
any way of expressing discrete units of time is demonstrably false. Colin 
Turnbull’s report of the complete lack of compassion among the Ik tribe 
turned out to be !ction. Bronislaw Malinowski’s alleged counterexample 
to the Oeidipus complex among the Trobriand is also quite questionable. 
Even the favorite cocktail party example of cultural difference, the claim 
that Eskimos have 22 words for snow, has turned out to be a myth.33 
In contrast with these approaches, anthropologist Donald E. Brown (a 
recovering relativist himself) argues that we !nd a set of characteristics 
that are nearly universal among human societies, including the use of 
narrative and poetry, facial expressions such as smiling and crying, mar-
riage, incest taboos, rituals to mourn the dead, prohibitions against theft 
and the wanton use of violence, and many others.34 
Are the similarities that we !nd among cultures best explained by a 
Mengzian or a Xunzian account of human nature? Consider the fact that 
we !nd some form of the institution of marriage in every human culture. 
Mengzi would say that, as part of our shared human nature, we all !nd 
certain things ethically shameful: even a beggar will be offended if you 
offer him a handout with contempt (Mengzi 6A10). However, our innate 
sense of shame is merely incipient, like the sprout of a plant (2A6). 
Like a sprout, our incipient sense of shame can either mature or wither, 
depending upon both our social environment and our individual effort 
(6A8, 6A9). If our sense of shame is allowed to follow its natural course 
of development, we will disdain to furtively satisfy our sexual desires 
(3B3). Consequently, marriage rituals exist because they provide a social 
sanction for our sexual desires, allowing us to satisfy them without shame. 
In contrast, Xunzi would argue that we innately have the desire for sex 
but not even the incipient sense of shame. For us to come to regard the 
furtive satisfaction of sexual desires as shameful, our emotions must be 
reshaped, as arduously and arti!cially as “steaming and bending” a piece 
of lumber that is as “straight as a plumb line into a wheel.”35 This trans-
formation is justi!ed, Xunzi would argue, because unrestrained sexual 
desires would lead us to harm one another. The fundamental differences 
between the views of Mengzi and Xunzi is re"ected in their metaphors. 
Mengzi’s favorite metaphors for ethical cultivation are agricultural (like 
nurturing the sprout of a plant until it grows into maturity). In contrast, 
Xunzi prefers technological metaphors, which involve reshaping a passive 
and perhaps recalcitrant material (like grinding metal or carving wood). 
Mengzi would no doubt have said to Xunzi what he said to Gaozi (who 
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proposed that “to make human nature benevolent and righteous is like 
making a willow tree into cups and bowls”):
Can you, sir, following the nature of the willow tree, make 
it into cups and bowls? You must violate and rob the willow 
tree, and only then can you make it into cups and bowls. If 
you must violate and rob the willow tree in order to make 
it into cups and bowls, must you also violate and rob people 
in order to make them benevolent and righteous? If there 
is something that leads people to regard benevolence and 
righteousness as misfortunes for them, it will surely be your 
doctrine, will it not?36
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully adjudicate the disagreement 
between Mengzi and Xunzi. However, I think it is clear that Mengzi, 
like Xunzi, fails to do justice to pluralism: there are a variety of distinct 
but equally adequate forms of marriage ceremonies, funeral rituals, etc.37 
Kupperman’s comments on this general topic are, as usual, judicious. He 
encourages us to
reject two extreme (and I think untenable) sorts of positions. 
One is to insist that a worthwhile account of human nature 
must be de!nite and hold true of people at all times and in 
all social conditions. The other tempting extreme is to hold 
that there could not be such an account or anything even 
remotely like it. Human nature is various, and that is the 
last word on the subject. . . . It is not unreasonable, though, 
to think it possible to arrive at an account of human nature 
that is largely true. This would be an account that captured 
ways in which a great many people, in various cultures, tend 
to think and behave at most times.38
Whatever our speci!c view on human nature, it seems quite clear that 
we do not !nd human cultures as wildly divergent as some advocates 
of the argument from disagreement suggest. In addition, no one has yet 
given a suf!ciently detailed account of why the disagreement we do !nd 
is “best explained” by anti-realism. The argument from disagreement is 
at best a promissory note that anti-realists have yet to make good. 
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The Case for Anthropocentric Realism
The Why Question
As I explained earlier, Xunzi argues that “rituals and righteousness” are 
arti!cial constructs that are objectively justi!ed by their role in rescuing 
humans from their natural state of sel!shness and intemperance, which 
(if unchecked) will lead to mutually destructive competition for scarce 
resources. This line of argument is anthropocentric, because it attempts 
to provide a justi!cation for values that is objective, yet ultimately 
grounds value in human needs and agency. As Eric Hutton has noted, 
there are plausible ways of interpreting Xunzi and Aristotle according 
to which there are some broad similarities between their approaches. 
However, the differences between them are also quite signi!cant. The 
emphasis in Xunzi is on the “the Way of human community, where this 
is understood as organized society.”39 In contrast, Aristotle “seems to con-
centrate more on the notion of eudaimonia [living well] as the individual’s 
good.”40 In the remainder of this paper I shall offer an anthropocentric 
argument inspired by Aristotle’s account of human practical reasoning.
In attempting to understand Aristotle’s justi!cation for ethics, read-
ers often focus on the controversial “function argument” of Nicomachean 
Ethics I.7. Here, Aristotle suggests that just as what it is to be a good 
sculptor depends upon the function of a sculptor, so does being a good 
human depend upon the function of a human. Aristotle identi!es this 
with what is distinctive of humans as a species, and thinks this is our 
rationality. For a contemporary audience, this argument is problematic 
on several grounds, which we do not have to rehearse here. However, 
readers often overlook the fact that the function argument is a detour 
(one of Aristotle’s famous digressions) from an alternative justi!ca-
tion for ethics based on practical reasoning (Nicomachean Ethics I.1–5). 
Indeed, Thomas Aquinas focuses on this alternative account in his own 
discussion of the human good (Summa Theologiae II-I, Q. 1).41 
For Aristotle and those who follow him, the primary ethical ques-
tion is whether our actions and motivations are rational. Words like 
“rational,” “logical,” and “reasonable” sometimes arouse negative reac-
tions, especially when applied to actions and motivations. As a pop song 
from the 70s whines,
When I was young, it seemed that life was so wonderful,
a miracle, oh it was beautiful, magical.
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And all the birds in the trees, well they’d be singing so 
happily,
oh joyfully, oh playfully watching me.
But then they sent me away to teach me how to be sensible,
logical, oh responsible, practical.42
So it is perhaps worth explaining that the starting point of this approach 
is nothing sinister or esoteric; it is the simple recognition that “Why 
are you doing that?” is always a legitimate question to ask of a human 
being. Sometimes this question is looking for a causal answer. “Why are 
you sweating so much?” “I just came from the gym.” But Aristotelians 
are particularly interested in cases where the question seeks a justi!ca-
tional answer (the “!nal cause”): “Why are you going to the gym?” “I’m 
training for a marathon.” So practical rationality is really just concerned 
with justi!cational answers to the question “Why are you doing that?”
This might seem to land us in relativism, though. Our answer to 
“the why question” depends upon what our goals are, and these are 
often assumed to be subjective. Such was the opinion of David Hume, 
who famously denied that our actions and motivations can be rational 
or irrational:
’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the 
whole world to the scratching of my !nger. ’Tis not contrary 
to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least 
uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. ’Tis 
as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d 
lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection 
for the former than the latter.43
This is a provocative suggestion, but why should we assent to it? If I did 
prefer “my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater,” it would seem 
natural (both as a matter of common sense and of ordinary language 
usage) to say that I was being “foolish,” “stupid” and, yes, “unreasonable.” 
However, Hume is con!dent about his claim because it follows from his 
particular philosophical psychology. The contents of the human mind, 
Hume asserts, consist solely of “impressions” and “ideas.” Impressions 
are “all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their !rst 
appearance in the soul.”44 Ideas, in turn, “are deriv’d from impressions, 
and are nothing but copies and representations of them.”45 Truth and 
falsehood consist in the agreement or disagreement “of ideas, consider’d 
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as copies, with those objects, which they represent.”46 Given these 
assumptions, Hume’s conclusion follows fairly directly:
Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or 
disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can 
never be an object of our reason. Now ‘tis evident our pas-
sions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such 
agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, 
compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other 
passions, volitions, and actions. ’Tis impossible, therefore, they 
can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary 
or conformable to reason.47
In other words, only certain kinds of “ideas” can be true of false, because 
only they, being copies (of either sensory impressions or other ideas), can 
correspond or fail to correspond to their objects. A “passion,” as Hume 
calls any motivational state, “contains not any representative quality, 
which renders it a copy of any other existence.”48 Therefore, no passion 
(and by the same reasoning, no action) can be rational or irrational. 
Unfortunately for Hume, no informed philosopher today would accept 
his philosophical psychology. 
Even if we did !nd plausible Hume’s account of impressions and 
ideas, his claim about the nonrationality of passions and actions is 
stipulative and arbitrary. Motivations and actions cannot be rationally 
assessed, Hume claims, because reason is solely the discovery of truth 
and falsehood, and neither motivations nor actions can be true or false. 
Admittedly, if I “prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratch-
ing of my !nger,” my preference is neither true nor false. But it is ques-
tion-begging to assume that rationality is only about truth and falsity. 
Consequently, unless we accept Hume’s outmoded account of impressions 
and ideas, or his unwarranted stipulation that reason is only about truth 
and falsity, he has given us no reason to deny that the statement “You 
ought to prefer your greater good to your lesser good” is true.
Although we lack a good argument against it, we might still won-
der why we need to make objective evaluative assessments of practice. 
(I don’t have a good argument against square dancing either, but it’s 
clearly not necessary and I don’t want to do it.) My answer is that 
objective evaluative assessments are indispensable to anything recogniz-
able as human agency. One type of such evaluation is captured by the 
Hypothetical Imperative: if you choose goal, G, then you ought to take 
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the most ef!cient means, M.49 For example, if Bloggs (a novice runner) 
chooses to run in a marathon, then Bloggs ought to train four days a 
week for 18 weeks prior to the event. This statement is surely not a 
pure description of what Bloggs will do: Bloggs might choose to run 
in a marathon, but fail to train adequately. One might object that, if 
Bloggs doesn’t train adequately, he really didn’t “choose” to run in the 
marathon. Admittedly, if Bloggs didn’t train for the marathon at all and 
didn’t even show up, we could legitimately question whether he had 
actually chosen to participate. But there might be plenty of reasons to 
think that Bloggs had chosen to participate in a marathon (he signs up 
for the marathon, he trains intermittently, he shows up and runs in it) 
even if his preparation was inadequate. Perhaps Bloggs wants to run in 
a marathon but doesn’t care if he does well? But it seems quite possible 
that someone like Bloggs wants and hopes to do well in the marathon, 
but succumbs to weakness of will by skipping too many practices and 
eating badly. So if Bloggs chooses to run in a marathon (really chooses, as 
would be evident not just from his words but from some of his actions), 
and if he wishes to do well in it, and if he is a novice runner of average 
health, then he ought to train for four days a week for 18 weeks prior 
to the event. 
If this example (or any other instance of the Hypothetical 
Imperative) is true, then there is at least one objective evaluative claim. 
Let us consider a potential objection: “The ‘ought’ in this example is a 
subjective evaluation, not an objective one, because Bloggs’s choice to 
run in a marathon is a matter of personal preference. Surely you don’t 
think that Bloggs is objectively obligated to run in a marathon?” This 
objection fails to distinguish between the Hypothetical Imperative and 
its constituent propositions. The consequent of the hypothetical (“Bloggs 
ought to train four days a week for 18 weeks prior to the event”) is 
not objective, because it only follows from the truth of the antecedent 
(“Bloggs chooses to run in a marathon”), which is dependent upon a con-
tingent and subjective choice. However, the truth of the hypothetical as 
a whole is neither contingent nor subjective. If training four days a week 
for 18 weeks is in fact the best means for a human of Bloggs’s physical 
condition to prepare for a marathon, then the complete hypothetical, “If 
Bloggs chooses to run in a marathon, then he ought to train four days 
a week for 18 weeks prior to the event,” is true, and true independently 
of what any individual believes, true independently of what any group 
of people believe, and true independently of whether Bloggs does in fact 
choose to run in a marathon.50 Instances of the Hypothetical Imperative 
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are central to our ordinary agency and practical reasoning. Consequently, 
we are committed to objective evaluations.51 Although this is a very 
speci!c and limited conclusion, it is nonetheless important. Once we 
acknowledge the necessity of even one objective evaluation, we see that 
there is nothing in principle implausible or philosophically promiscuous 
about accepting them. 
Although he does not use the phrase “Hypothetical Imperative,” 
Hume was aware that this principle was a prima facie counterexample 
to his claim that motivations and actions are never irrational. He grudg-
ingly admits that “by an abusive way of speaking, which philosophy will 
scarce allow of,”52 we might say that an action or motivation is unrea-
sonable “when founded on a false supposition, or when it chuses means 
insuf!cient for the design’d end.”53 Hume’s response was to attempt to 
naturalize the Hypothetical Imperative by making it descriptive rather 
than prescriptive:
The moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, 
or the insuf!ciency of any means our passions yield to our 
reason without any opposition.54
It is easy to miss what a stunning (and implausible) suggestion this is. If 
Hume is correct, there has never been anyone who, like Bloggs, planned 
to run in a marathon, but then skipped practice too many times; there 
has never been anyone who knew that having “just one more cigarette” 
would sabotage her efforts to quit smoking, yet smoked it anyway; there 
has never been anyone who continued to love someone after her illu-
sions about him were shattered. Would that people were as practically 
rational as Hume assumes!
Although instances of the Hypothetical Imperative are objective 
evaluations, the “ought” of the consequent only applies to someone who 
satis!es the antecedent of the conditional. If I don’t plan to run in a 
marathon, I have done nothing wrong by failing to train for one. Some 
philosophers would concede that there are facts about what we ought to 
do given what our goals are, but no facts about what our goals ought to 
be. In other words, one might concede that there are objective answers 
to the why question when it comes to means, but no objective answers 
when it comes to goals. I shall approach the issue of whether there 
are any objectively valuable goals in two steps. First, I shall argue that 
there are goals that actually motivate some human beings that can be 
seen to be rationally indefensible. Second, I shall propose some goals 
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that are not only defensible, but could only be challenged via moot or 
fantastic objections. 
Four Inadequate Answers to the Why Question
Let us imagine that Bloggs seems to dislike his job as an attorney. We 
ask him, “Why are you working as an attorney when you don’t enjoy it?” 
Bloggs can refuse to answer, but he cannot deny the legitimacy of the 
question. Perhaps he will respond, “I make more money as an attorney 
than I could make any other way.” We persist by asking, “Why do you 
need so much money? There are other jobs that would give you enough 
to survive comfortably.” Bloggs replies, “I need money for the sake of 
money.” This fails as a rational justi!cation, because money is only a 
means to other ends. If money were intrinsically valuable, then the best 
strategy would be to collect something like Confederate currency; it is 
much easier to get than U.S. dollars. Of course, you cannot buy any-
thing with Confederate currency. But this just shows that what makes 
money desirable is the things other than money that you can get with 
it. Despite this fact, there are many people who, like Bloggs, act as if 
money were an intrinsically valuable goal: they struggle to accumulate 
far more money than is needed to ensure their physical comfort and 
security, without any clear conception of some other goal their money 
will help them achieve. But insofar as people do act like Bloggs, we can 
see that their behavior is irrational. 
In reality, Bloggs is more likely to give a different answer, such as, 
“I work as an attorney because I hope to get a big case that will make 
me famous.” Fame is one of the most valued goods in our celebrity-
obsessed culture, so we know that people have motivations like the 
one Bloggs expresses. Indeed, there are people who seem to want fame 
at any cost. In 356 BCE, Herostratus set !re to the Temple of Artemis 
at Ephesus (one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World) simply 
because he believed that this gratuitous act of destruction would ensure 
his eternal fame. (Obviously, he was right.) However, it seems plausible 
to diagnose such an extreme craving for attention as a mental illness, 
perhaps brought on by a lack of personal validation earlier in life. If 
Herostratus had the talent and opportunity to be admired as a talented 
poet or skillful general, he would have preferred that to the choice he 
made. So suppose we press Bloggs further, asking, “Do you just want to 
be famous, or do you want to be famous for being good at something? If 
I offer you a choice between being famous because your incompetence 
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resulted in an innocent person going to prison, or being famous because 
of your skillful handling of a challenging case, which do you prefer?” 
Presumably, Bloggs would greatly prefer to be famous for being a skilled 
attorney. We might describe this by saying that what Bloggs really wants 
is not simply fame, but prestige. 
Prestige is very plausible as a part of the reason why we do what 
we do. All of us want to be admired for our good qualities. This is 
not inconsistent with humility. To paraphrase C. S. Lewis, humility is 
not about smart people pretending they are stupid, or attractive people 
pretending that they are ugly.55 Humility is about recognizing that our 
excellences are simply small parts of the big picture. Thus, I am entitled 
to enjoy the prestige that comes when students tell me they have got-
ten a lot out of my classes, or when colleagues tell me that they found 
something insightful in one of my papers. I just need to remind myself 
that my class is a very small part of any student’s life experience, and 
all of my scholarship does not amount to a single brushstroke on the 
canvas of world civilization. As these examples suggest, one has to be 
prestigious for something good. Thus, while it is not completely inac-
curate to state that one’s goal is prestige, it is incomplete. Furthermore, 
fame and prestige are problematic goals, because they are so dependent 
upon the whims of others. Bloggs will undoubtedly get a certain amount 
of prestige as an attorney. However, many other people share the view 
expressed by one of Shakespeare’s characters: “The !rst thing we do, 
let’s kill all the lawyers.”56 The same will be true of any career Bloggs 
chooses.57 
In our initial account of Bloggs, we stipulated that he does not 
enjoy being an attorney. Some would say that this shows he has already 
failed in his choice of goals, because pleasure is the only reasonable goal 
of human action. We can certainly agree that it should be part of our 
goal. But pleasure is similar to prestige in that both are incomplete goods. 
Just as one must get prestige for something, so must one take pleasure in 
something. There is the pleasure I get from scratching an itch. There is 
the pleasure I get from watching Bergman’s Hour of the Wolf. There is 
the pleasure I get from making love with my wife. There is the pleasure 
I get from watching The Simpsons. There is the pleasure I get from a 
good workout at the gym. There is the pleasure I get from a !ne meal 
at a gourmet restaurant. There is the pleasure I get from a greasy bacon 
double cheeseburger at a diner. There is the pleasure I get from writing 
this academic paper. There is the pleasure I get from talking and play-
ing with my children. Notice that the singular word “pleasure” masks a 
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huge diversity in states of consciousness, which sometimes have little in 
common besides the fact that we feel positively about them. There is 
really no such thing as pleasure simpliciter; there is only the pleasure-
of-X or the pleasure-of-Y.58 
“Be that as it may,” the hedonist replies, “our goal is still to maxi-
mize pleasure in some form.” There are at least three arguments against 
the hedonist, though. (1) All of us can imagine pleasures that we would 
prefer not to have. David Cronenberg’s 1996 !lm Crash explores the pos-
sibility of people who are sexually aroused by viewing and participating 
in fatal or crippling car crashes.59 I think most of my readers would be 
horri!ed to discover that they had developed such a fetish (and would 
seek therapy to overcome it should it develop) even if it turned out to 
be an intense source of pleasure. If this example seems too fanciful to 
have any bite, use your own imagination, and be honest with yourself 
about your gut reaction to certain pleasures. (2) Kupperman discusses 
another counterexample to the thesis that pleasure should be our only 
goal: the happy clam.60 Imagine our mental life reduced to its most 
basic functions, such as the pleasures of relieving hunger and eliminat-
ing waste (like a mollusk perhaps experiences). Let us stipulate that we 
will have no awareness of the kinds of pleasure that we have lost, so 
we will have no occasion for regret. Since we will only know about the 
simple pleasures we still have, they will seem the peak of delight to us. 
Nonetheless, almost all of us would be unwilling to trade our current 
lives (with their complex but often dif!cult-to-satisfy preferences) for 
that of a simple but satis!ed clam. The best explanation for our sense 
that there are shameful pleasures and that one can maximize certain 
kinds of pleasure yet still be missing something is that pleasures differ not 
only in quantity and kind, but also in value. (3) Once we acknowledge 
that pleasures are of fundamentally different kinds, we see that maximiz-
ing pleasure is not intelligible as a goal in itself. In order for the concept 
of “maximizing X” to have content, there has to be a metric for X that 
allows us to choose between alternatives based upon how much X each 
offers. However, since pleasures are so different, there can be no com-
mon metric by which they can be measured and compared. Consider a 
concrete example. I sometimes have to choose between spending quality 
time with my children and working on scholarly projects. Should I spend 
an extra hour with my children that I would have spent working on a 
book? Interacting-with-my-children pleasure simply feels different from 
writing-a-book pleasure, so I cannot directly compare one to the other, 
and make the choice based on which would maximize pleasure in some 
SP_LI_CH03_065-096.indd   83 3/7/14   1:07 PM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
84 Bryan W. Van Norden
neutral sense. (Sometimes we hear talk of “hedons” of pleasure, but this 
is at best a vague metaphor, and at worst a Procrustean quantitative 
fetishism with no basis in actual experience.) 
Does this mean that the choice of how to combine pleasures 
in a life is irrational? No. Not all reasoned judgments can be settled 
numerically. Any of Rembrandt’s self-portraits is better than any of C. 
M. Coolidge’s paintings of dogs playing poker, even though we cannot 
quantify the difference. Furthermore, in ordinary practical reasoning, 
pleasure is normally not the !rst thing that comes into our consider-
ation. In thinking about how to balance my role as a father with my 
role as a scholar, I am much more likely to start with assessments of the 
values I assign to the activities themselves, and of what kinds of time 
commitments I need to reach goals central to those values. I might be 
concerned that my child is having problems with school, so I spend more 
time helping with homework. Alternatively, perhaps I think I have a 
distinctive scholarly contribution to make with a particular article, but I 
have had trouble completing it, so one weekend I forgo a trip with my 
children to a Renaissance Faire in order to spend more time writing. I 
will get pleasure from either activity, but the pleasure is not the focus of 
the deliberation. Pleasure becomes the focus only in special cases, like 
when we are trying to decide what to do on our vacation (“Going to the 
beach would be nice, but I also like skiing. Which one would I enjoy 
more?”). I want to stress again that pleasure is an important component 
of living well. Perhaps someone could rationally choose a life in which 
there was little pleasure, but at the very least we would seriously ques-
tion that choice. But there is a world of difference between saying, (1) 
it counts strongly against the rationality of a choice if it does not bring 
pleasure of some kind (true), and (2) the maximization of pleasure can 
and should be the sole determinant of all our choices (false). 
I hope to have made two points in the preceding section. First, 
the choice of human goals cannot be completely subjective, because 
there are some (even ones that motivate many humans) that are simply 
unintelligible as ultimate goals. For example, wealth is rational as an 
intermediate goal, a means to achieving some further end, but it is simply 
unintelligible to suggest that wealth is an ultimate goal in itself. Second, 
we have seen that some things are reasonable to pursue as aspects of 
our ultimate goals (like prestige and pleasure), but they are conceptu-
ally dependent on some other goal to give them concrete form. In the 
next section, I shall argue in favor of six candidates for ultimate goals.
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Six Adequate Answers to the Why Question
We have been discussing a variety of unsatisfactory answers that Bloggs 
could give to our question, “Why are you an attorney?” but now let us 
approach from the opposite direction and consider what an adequate 
response would be. Suppose Bloggs says, “I am a defense attorney because 
I think it is important to protect the innocent. Even when I know my 
client is guilty, I feel like I am serving the community because I am a 
bulwark against the indiscriminate exercise of government power.” At 
long last, we have an intelligible, defensible answer. Bloggs has told us 
what he !nds valuable in his career, and we can sympathetically under-
stand it as an intrinsically valuable goal. When we imagined Bloggs say-
ing that he is an attorney because it makes him the most money, it was 
legitimate for us to ask what he wants all that money for. In contrast, if 
Bloggs says that he is an attorney because he wants to help others and 
serve the community, it makes no sense for us to challenge him, “But 
why would you want that?” The difference is due to the fact that money 
is merely an instrumental good, while helping others is intelligible to 
us as an ultimate goal. 
How does it affect the adequacy of Bloggs’s answer that he seems not 
to enjoy being an attorney? Tortured geniuses like Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(in real life) or Dr. Gregory House (in !ction) have a sort of romantic 
appeal to them. My intuition is that their lives can be worthwhile, 
even though racked with pain and sadness. However, I am not certain 
of this, and even I admit that their lives would be better if they were 
more pleasant. But the case of Bloggs need not be so extreme. Let us 
suppose Bloggs explains, “Being a defense attorney is very stressful and 
frustrating, so I often seem to not be enjoying myself. However, I get 
immense satisfaction when I successfully defend the rights of a client. 
At the moment I can’t imagine being satis!ed by any other career.” Not 
only does this answer make sense, but we might think that Bloggs gets 
more satisfaction out of his work precisely because it is so challenging. 
Not everyone would concur, but for many of us a life without the stresses 
and pains that come from surmounting challenges sounds horri!c. This 
perspective is illustrated in the Twilight Zone episode in which a criminal, 
“Rocky Valentine,” dies and awakens in a world where his every wish 
is instantly met: he has unlimited amounts of cash, he wins every time 
he gambles, police are powerless before him, and he is surrounded by 
beautiful women (who lack any personality that might lead them to resist 
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his whims). After a month, Rocky is almost insane with boredom, and 
tells the person whom he thinks is his guardian angel, “If I gotta stay 
here another day, I’m going to go nuts! I don’t belong in Heaven, see? 
I want to go to the other place.” The angel replies, “Heaven? Whatever 
gave you the idea that you were in Heaven, Mr. Valentine? This is ‘the 
other place!’ ”61
Being a defense attorney is an example of what Aristotelians call 
a “political” life (in a broad sense of that term). While we should heed 
Kupperman’s admonition that “it would seem doctrinaire to claim to 
be able to limit in advance the number of major types of very good 
lives,”62 it would be potentially useful to many true “lovers of wisdom” 
if we could categorize some of the more plausible candidates. Three 
kinds of goods have been serious contenders for intrinsic value in the 
pre-modern Western tradition: (1) theoretical understanding and inquiry 
(as might be exempli!ed in the life of the theoretical physicist, the pure 
mathematician, and the academic philosopher); (2) practical activity 
with others for the good of one’s community (as could be seen in the 
life of a senator, a bureaucrat at the FDA, and a defense attorneys like 
our friend Bloggs); and (3) religious devotion (as might be found in the 
life of a monk, hermit, or monastic nun). These goods can be combined 
in certain kinds of lives. No matter how “pure” our research, most of 
us in academia have to walk back down into “the Cave” and take our 
turn as chair or dean. Similarly, Jesuits like Frederick Copleston famously 
combine religious devotion with theoretical inquiry. 
In addition to the traditional three candidates, there are other 
kinds of goods that have been proposed as intrinsically valuable. (4) 
G. E. Moore suggested that it is “universally admitted that the proper 
appreciation of a beautiful object is a good thing in itself.”63 He was 
perhaps overoptimistic about how universal this view is, but it is cer-
tainly a common and plausible one. It is rare that one will be able to 
organize one’s entire life around just the appreciation of beauty; however, 
it is undoubtedly a valuable component of a good life. (5) Because we 
value the appreciation of beauty in art, most of us would acknowledge 
that the production of art also has intrinsic value. The appreciation and 
production of art are related activities, but not identical. I could have 
very good taste in music without being able to create it. In addition, 
artists are not always insightful about other arts or the work of other 
artists. But someone who said that she is working to produce beautiful 
paintings, sculptures, pieces of music, poems, or novels would not have 
to provide a further justi!cation for her actions.
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I think most of my readers will appreciate the value of the preced-
ing categories. However, I want to argue now for a more controversial 
type of intrinsic value: (6) skillful activity in a practice. I am here appro-
priating Alasdair MacIntyre’s speci!c notion of a “practice,” by which 
he means a “cooperative human activity through which goods internal 
to that form of activity are realized.”64 “Internal goods” are those that 
can only be obtained through a speci!c practice. External goods can 
in principle be obtained in other ways; the activity is only a means to 
external goods. We can illustrate the distinction with the practice of 
teaching. An external good of teaching would be earning a salary. An 
internal good would be the experience of !nally “reaching” a student 
who was initially resistant to learning.65 
Not every human activity has internal goods. Changing the bulb 
on my headlight is not a practice, because the only good that results 
is external (even though important): I can see when I drive at night. 
Nothing will be lost if I achieve the same goal in other ways (as by 
hiring a mechanic to !x it). Internal goods arise at least in part because 
practices present challenges to humans of potentially in!nite complexity. 
Because practices are complex in this way,
. . . human powers to achieve excellence [in a given practice], 
and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a 
practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; 
but the game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not 
a practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; 
farming is.66 
Let’s consider the example of Western chess in more detail. Playing chess 
well is obviously a challenging activity. This is part of the reason that chess 
a!cionados are intrigued by and admire especially good moves or ingenious 
solutions to chess problems. Chess is also an endless source of fascination 
because, although the basic rules have not changed since the nineteenth 
century, the tactics of chess continually evolve. One test of whether an 
activity is a practice is whether it is appropriate to say of at least one 
practitioner, “Not only was she really good at it, but she revolutionized 
the way we do it.” For example, Wilhelm Steinitz, the !rst World Chess 
Champion, revolutionized the game with his subtle positional approach.67
Some of MacIntyre’s examples of practices—including physics, 
chemistry, biology, painting, music, and “politics in the Aristotelian 
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sense”—are consistent with the valuable ways of life we discussed 
above.68 However, MacIntyre’s examples of chess and football fall outside 
our categories (1) through (5), as would similar practices like playing 
poker, cooking, bonsai, pumpkin carving, and jiu-jitsu. I would further 
expand the list of practices in directions not suggested by MacIntyre. 
I have no doubt that Plato and Aristotle, at least, would !nd accoun-
tancy a vulgar and banausic activity. I would argue, though, that being 
an accountant could be a practice. Because the business world is always 
changing, accounting procedures are always in "ux, and it requires a 
thoughtful approach to determine what are legitimate and illegitimate 
ways of measuring revenues, expenses, assets, liabilities, retained earnings, 
etc. (Luca Pacioli’s Summa Arithmetica of 1494 revolutionized account-
ing by publicizing and standardizing the method of double-entry book-
keeping.) Similarly, the various forms of engineering have not surfaced 
on traditional lists of intrinsically valuable activities, but the complex 
and ever-changing challenges presented by engineering problems make 
solving them a practice.69 If engaging in practices is intrinsically valu-
able, chemical engineers, CPAs, and poker players who are devoted to 
their respective crafts and do them well can take their place alongside 
philosopher-kings and saints as paradigms of lives that are well-led.70 
Conclusion
Let’s return to an example I used at the beginning of this paper: the 
claim “pure carbon dioxide is poisonous” is true. This claim is only true 
because there are animals like human beings; there would be no content 
to the notion of “poisonous” in a universe without animals. However, the 
claim is not, for that reason, subjective. Long before any human being 
or culture knew that there was such a thing as CO2, it was true that 
inhaling pure carbon dioxide would be lethal. I have argued in this paper 
that claims like “Producing beautiful works of art is a worthwhile goal” 
are similarly anthropocentric. This claim is true only because humans 
exist, and because humans have the needs and capacities that we have; 
however, its truth is not relative to either individual whims or cultural 
fads. Producing beautiful works of art is intelligible as an ultimate goal 
in a way that the mere accumulation of wealth is simply not.
There are far more potential questions and objections to the theses 
of this paper than I can answer here or even anticipate. But I want to 
conclude by addressing one counterargument that I suspect will have 
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particular urgency for many readers: “You seem to expect everyone to 
justify themselves to others and to their standards of rationality. Suppose 
Bloggs did insist that he wanted money for the sake of money? Suppose 
Herostratus did say that he preferred fame to prestige? Suppose someone 
said that his overarching goal in life is to count the blades of grass in 
various geometrically shaped plots?71 Why should it carry any weight 
that these answers seem incoherent or unsatisfactory to you or to any-
one else?”
To answer this objection, we need to take a step back and consider 
the nature of philosophy itself. For centuries, people have gone out of 
their way to denounce Descartes and accuse others of being Cartesians. 
But many of these same critics accept without re"ection the fundamen-
tal subjectivism of Descartes’s approach. To really exorcise the ghost of 
Descartes, we must reject his view of philosophy as a solitary monologue, 
in which each person is answerable only to his own standards. As both 
the Analects of Confucius and the dialogues of Plato show (in their dis-
tinctive ways), philosophy is a discussion between humans attempting 
to reach a shared understanding. The attempt is not guaranteed to be 
successful, and understanding is not identical with agreement. In our 
individual lives and human history we increasingly recognize the extent 
to which others disagree with our view of the world. But we are able 
to recognize this only because we understand the values and perspec-
tives that we do not agree with. To give up on understanding others 
is not to respect them; it is to objectify them, to treat them as we do 
rocks, plants, or hurricanes, whose “actions” can be causally explained, 
but not justi!ed. To treat others as humans is to treat them as beings 
whom you can potentially ask, “Why are you doing that?” and expect 
an intelligible answer. Their answer may surprise you, challenge you, or 
disturb you, but until you have understood it, you have not done justice 
to your shared humanity with them.
And if you don’t agree with that, tell me “Why?” and we will begin 
a dialogue aimed at achieving a shared understanding.
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Notes
 1. “People often have a sense of having experienced how much value, 
or lack of value, various things have. In some of these cases, it looks reasonable 
to suppose that they have got it pretty much right; that what they value really 
does have value, or that what they disvalue really is boring, empty, or abhor-
rent” (Kupperman 2006, 143). Elsewhere, Kupperman remarks, “there seems no 
harm in speaking of value facts, as long as we bear in mind that to speak of 
the fact that X has high value . . . is equivalent to saying that X really does 
have high value” (Kupperman 1999b, 81). Formulations like this simply “draw 
a contrast between what Smith or Bloggs or a casual onlooker might take the 
value of some experiences to be, on the one hand, and some more authoritative 
judgment, on the other” (Kupperman 1999b, 80).
 2. “Broad general rules provide a useful starting point and core of any 
morality; but there should be more to a morality than a core. . . . There is no 
requirement in logic or in the nature of moral thought that maxims take the 
form of general rules. Nor, if we do rely on rules, can we infer that for any 
given morally problematic case there is a single general rule that clearly and 
incontrovertibly is appropriate to that case” (Kupperman 1991, 77–78).
 3. “Even if one accepts Aristotle’s favorable evaluation of the highly 
intellectual contemplative life, surely it is also true that lives that center on 
aesthetic creation, aesthetic experience, effective political and social activities, 
or on styles of personal relations can be very good. . . .” (Kupperman 1991, 
134. See also 144–145.)
 4. Kupperman notes both that “It is easy to jump to conclusions about 
someone else’s life because we have missed nuances that are important to its 
value,” but also that “No one has ever advanced a coherent and convincing 
set of reasons for saying that judgments of this sort are nonsense or have to be 
false” (Kupperman 1991, 133).
 5. Kupperman advocates what he describes as “a modest skepticism” 
about our knowledge of value, which “can be conducive to keeping an open 
mind.” However, he quickly adds that “complete skepticism would be unwar-
ranted” (Kupperman 2006, 138).
 6. My typology of realism and anti-realism in this paper is not meant 
to be exhaustive. I am simply focusing on what I think are some of the more 
common and plausible positions.
 7. Kupperman 1999b, 81.
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 8. Kupperman 1999b, 81. Kupperman also notes: “It is natural to speak 
of ‘values’ in connection with our thought about and experience of what is or 
is not of value; and then it is easy to go from that to thinking of values as like 
things, furniture of a peculiar sort among the other furniture of the universe. 
But the objects of our thought and experience, even when they are empirical 
features of the real world, are not always things. In this respect it is healthy 
to compare values to the rate of in"ation or to magnetic !elds. Neither seems 
particularly furniturelike, and each is an interpretative construct related to (less 
conspicuously interpreted) underlying phenomena” (Kupperman 1999b, 74).
 9. Kupperman 1999b, 82.
10. See Wiggins 1987; McDowell 1998; Putnam 1992. 
11. For a defense of the interpretation of Xunzi I sketch here, see Van 
Norden 2011, Chapter X, 163–183; Van Norden 2000; Van Norden 1993.
12. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 269. (Translation slightly modi!ed.)
13. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 274.
14. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 272.
15. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 299.
16. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 281–282. (Translation slightly 
modi!ed.)
17. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 284.
18. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 276.
19. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 283.
20. Kupperman 2000. Kupperman also makes passing reference to Xunzi 
in Kupperman 2001, 37, 77 and Kupperman 1999a, 101.
21. Gallup Poll, conducted December 2010 <http://www.gallup.com/
poll/145286/>. In 2010, only 16 percent of those polled believed that a purely 
naturalistic view of evolution accounts for the human species.
22. In 2004, Nathaniel Abraham, who holds an MS in biology and a 
PhD in philosophy from an accredited university, was hired by Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institution on the basis of his credentials, but he was dismissed 
when he revealed to his superior that he is a Creationist (Boston Globe, 
December 7, <http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/12/07/biologist_
!red_for_beliefs_suit_says/>). In addition, Benjamin Stein (a law professor 
and former New York Times columnist) co-wrote and starred in Expelled: No 
Intelligence Allowed, a !lm criticizing evolutionary theory and championing intel-
ligent design (Frankowski, Miller, Stein & Ruloff 2008). 
23. Kupperman asks, “What logic connects the claim that very often we 
cannot expect consensus in judgments of value with the conclusion that such 
judgments cannot be correct? There surely is no logical contradiction in the 
notion of correct propositions about which, nevertheless, people cannot entirely 
agree” (Kupperman 2006, 140–141).
24. Charles Sanders Peirce was the !rst to emphasize that inference to the 
best explanation (or “abduction” as he called it) is a form of argument distinct 
from deduction. See Fann 1970.
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25. Mackie 1991, sketches an inference to the best explanation version of 
what he labels (somewhat misleadingly) the “argument from relativity.” However, 
he simply asserts that moral disagreement is best explained by the absence of 
moral facts, without discussing any detailed examples to make his case. 
26. Hume 1983, 113. (Emphasis in original.)
27. Herodotus, History, Book III.
28. David Wong, 1986, has argued that the disagreements between 
Western and East Asian cultures over individualism and !lial piety are suf!cient 
to support “relativism.” However, he has con!rmed (in conversation) my sense 
that what he means by “relativism” is much like what I would label “pluralism.”
29. Montaigne 1958, 156.
30. Montaigne 1958, 155.
31. Kupperman’s extensive and insightful work in comparative philosophy 
is a further illustration of this approach to cultural differences. See, for example, 
Kupperman 1999a and Kupperman 2001.
32. For a thoughtful discussion of how contemporary anthropology has 
helped challenge narrow views of human nature, see Clifford Geertz 1973.
33. See Freeman 1986; Malotki 1983; Grinker 2001; Spiro 1992; Martin 
1986.
34. Brown 1991, Chapter 6.
35. Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 256. 
36. Mengzi 6A1. Translation from Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005, 
144–145.
37. Some philosophers interpret Mengzi and Xunzi as being much more 
similar in their views of human nature than I suggest here. For one such account, 
see Ni 2009. Ni also presents a provocative account of Mengzi as holding a non-
cognitivist view of human nature, according to which the claim that “human 
nature is good” is neither true nor false, but is rather a “performative” recom-
mendation. For my own (cognitivist) account of Mengzi, see Van Norden 2011. 
In addition, I argue in Van Norden 2007, that, although traditional Confucians 
were not pluralists themselves, the core insights of Confucianism can be incor-
porated into a pluralistic philosophy.
38. Kupperman 2010, 189–190.
39. Hutton 2002, 373.
40. Hutton 2002, 374.
41. I hasten to note that neither Aristotle nor Aquinas was an anthro-
pocentric realist about values. This is re"ected in the important role that “!nal 
causes” play in Aristotelian physics and in the “function argument” of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. What I am doing in this paper is appropriating a particular 
aspect of Aristotle’s approach that does not in itself require anything beyond 
anthropocentric realism about values. 
42. Supertramp 1979.
43. Hume 1978, Book II, Part III, Section III, 416. (Emphasis in original.)
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44. Hume 1978, Book I, Part I, Section I, 1.
45. Hume 1978, Book I, Part I, Section VII, 19.
46. Hume 1978, Book II, Part III, Section III, 415. For example, if I have 
a “complex idea” that consists of a mental image of the Space Needle in Seattle, 
my idea is true, because it is an accurate copy of a sensory impression of the 
Space Needle; however, if I have an idea of the Space Needle in Portland, my 
idea is false, because it does not accurately copy any sensory impression.
47. Hume 1978, Book III, Part I, Section I, 458.
48. Hume 1978, Book II, Part III, Section III, 415.
49. In order to be fully adequate, any account of the Hypothetical 
Imperative would have to be much more complex, and could not treat our 
goals in isolation. However, all I need for my argument is the acknowledgement 
that we cannot do without some version of reasoning about the best means to 
achieve our goals. 
50. The truth of the claim is anthropocentric, though. If there were no 
human beings, there would be no fact about how long humans have to train 
for them (and also no truth about how long a “marathon” is).
51. Another potential objection is that the “ought” of the Hypothetical 
Imperative is non-moral. If I choose to run in a marathon but fail to adequately 
train, I am guilty of a failure of practical rationality, but not guilty of a moral 
failure. This is accurate, but I am not attempting to defend a distinction between 
moral and other kinds of value. It is suf!cient for my purposes if I establish that 
there are objective values of some kind.
52. Hume 1978, Book III, Part I, Section I, 459.
53. Hume 1978, Book II, Part III, Section III, 416.
54. Hume 1978, Book II, Part III, Section III, 416.
55. Lewis 1992, Letter XIV, 73.
56. “Dick the Butcher,” in Henry VI, Part II (Act IV, Scene 2).
57. Does Bloggs aim at genuine prestige or specious prestige? In other 
words, would he rather be admired for a good quality that he actually has, 
or for a quality people mistakenly think he has? Here I think we should say 
the same thing we said about fame: we can imagine someone seeking specious 
prestige, but we cannot imagine them rationally preferring specious prestige to 
merited prestige.
58. Aristotle puts this rather poetically by saying that the pleasure that 
accompanies an activity is like the bloom upon the cheek of a healthy youngster 
(Nicomachean Ethics X.5, 1174b30). Aquinas puts it more technically by saying 
that pleasure is not the “essence” of living well, but rather a “proper accident” 
of it (Summa Theologiae II-I, Question 2, Article 6).
59. Cronenberg, Thomas, & Lantos (1996) is not to be confused with 
the !lm of the same name by Paul Haggis (2005).
60. Kupperman 2006, 3–4.
61. Beaumont 1960. 
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62. Kupperman 1991, 134.
63. Moore 1903, §114, 189.
64. MacIntyre 1984, 187.
65. The internal goods of a practice can be ignored, as is illustrated by 
the character “Elizabeth” in the !lm Bad Teacher: “When I !rst started teaching, 
I thought that I was doing it for all the right reasons: shorter hours, summers 
off, no accountability . . .” (Kasdan, Eisenberg & Stupnitsky [2011]). MacIntyre 
would say, I think, that teaching is a practice, but “Elizabeth” does not treat 
it as such. 
66. MacIntyre 1984, 187.
67. In a comparison of Steinitz to one of his leading opponents, someone 
said, “Kolisch is a highwayman and points the pistol at your breast. Steinitz is 
a pickpocket, he steals a pawn and wins a game with it” (Anderssen, 1887).
68. MacIntyre 1984, 187–188. It might seem that any human activity 
(other than the most mindlessly simple and repetitious) counts as a “practice.” 
However, some engaging human activities will fail. Stamp collecting may be 
fun, but I do not think that it is challenging (except insofar as one needs 
money to buy certain rare stamps) or complex enough (because the standards 
and techniques of stamp collecting do not evolve).
69. A classic defense of the value of engineering, both for its internal and 
its external goods, is Florman 1994. 
70. It will be evident to students of Confucianism that there is much more 
that can be said about the similarities and differences between the Aristotelian 
and Confucian views of the legitimate goals of human life. I explore these in 
more detail in Van Norden 2013. 
71. The example is borrowed from Rawls 1971, 432.
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